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DO NOT INITIATE DISCUSSIONS ON THE RESULTS OF
THE VIOXX GI OUTCOMES RESEARCH (VIGOR) STUDY,
OR ANY OF THE RECENT ARTICLES IN THE PRESS
ABOUT VIOXX. YOU MAY RESPOND ... ONLY AS OUT-
LINED BELOW ...
If the doctor asks you further [about the incidence of myocardial
infarction] tell them:
"In the clinical OA trials.., the incidence of [myocardial infarc-
tion] was less than 0.1% with VIOXX."
"Doctor, As [sic] you can see, Cardiovascular Mortality as re-
ported in over 6,000 patients was Vioxx .1 vs. NSAIDS .8 vs.
Placebo 0."'
INTRODUCTION
Drug manufacturers ("manufacturers") must obtain regulatory ap-
proval from the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") in order to
market their products in the United States. The FDA's statutory mandate
I. Merck, Bulletin for Vioxx: Action Required: Response to New York Times article
(May 23, 2001), http://dida.library.ucsf.edu/pdf/uibO0al0. This and similar documents di-
rected Merck sales staff to downplay and even obscure Vioxx's cardiovascular risks, even after
trial results indicated such risks were substantial. The excerpt above directs sales staff to in-
form doctors that Vioxx was eight times less likely to cause cardiovascular mortality
compared to competing drugs, a misleading statement based on Merck's own interpretation of
incomplete and irrelevant trial results. See Memorandum from Rep. Henry A. Waxman, The
Roles of FDA and Pharmaceutical Companies in Ensuring the Safety of Approved Drugs, Like
Vioxx, at 2-3 (May 5, 2005), http:/lwaxman.house.gov/UploadedFiles/merck.pdf. See also
Ronald M. Green, Direct-to-consuner Advertising and Pharmaceutical Ethics: The Case of
Vioxx, 35 HOFSTRA L. REv. 749, 752-53 (2006) (detailing Merck's aggressive marketing ef-
forts for Vioxx).
2. See FDA, Frequently Asked Questions on Drug Development and Investigational
New Drug Applications, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DefelopmentApprovalProcess/Small
BusinessAssistance/ucm069898.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2009) ("[Clurrent Federal law
requires that a drug be the subject of an approved marketing application before it is
transported or distributed across state lines."). See also James T. O'Reilly, Knowledge is
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charges it with the duty to protect the public health by ascertaining the
risks and benefits of exposing human bodies to drug molecules before
certifying these chemicals as safe and effective for their marketed indica-
tions. Accordingly, the FDA requires drug candidates to undergo a long,
costly, multi-step testing process, which may take many years and in-
clude several pre-clinical studies on model organisms, as well as up to
three clinical studies on human subjects . Briefly, a manufacturer first
files an Investigational New Drug ("IND") application with the FDA
after concluding pre-clinical animal trials and other toxicity studies on a
drug candidate! After the FDA approves the IND, the manufacturer may
commence human trials, at the conclusion of which the manufacturer
may file a New Drug Application ("NDA"). A drug may only be mar-
keted after the FDA approves the NDA.' Scientific and clinical data
generated during the approval process ("research data") are what distin-
guish "the products we call 'drugs' from similar products sold in
minimally regulated markets.' Although manufacturers bear the cost of
research data generation, it is oftentimes a worthwhile investment that
also confers significant commercial advantages. Consequently, they have
argued that research data should be considered a trade secret and kept
confidential. The FDA's longstanding position has been to accept this
proposition. Even when Congress appeared to mandate disclosure or
Power: Legislative Control of Drug Industry Trade Secrets, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 6 (1985)
(describing the regulatory framework from an industry perspective).
3. 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(1) (2006) (defining a new drug as "[any drug ... the composi-
tion of which is such that such drug is not generally recognized, among experts qualified by
scientific training and experience to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of drugs, as safe and
effective for use under the condition prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling
thereof...."); see Margaret A. Hamburg & Joshua M. Sharfstein, FDA as a Public Health
Agency, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2493 (2009) (citing United States v. Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S.
784 (1969) (emphasizing FDA's "overriding purpose" is to protect the public health)).
4. See Bruce N. Kuhlik, The Assault on Pharmaceutical Intellectual Property, 71 U.
CHI. L. REV. 93, 94 (2004) (claiming that obtaining FDA approval may take up to fifteen
years and cost an estimated $802 million).
5. Frequently Asked Questions on Drug Development and Investigational New Drug
Applications, supra note 2.
6. For a simplified version of the drug development process prepared for lay audi-
ences, see The FDA's Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs Are Safe and Effective, http:ll
www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/ucml43534.htm (last visited Aug. 8,
2009).
7. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM.
TECH. L. REV. 345, 347 (2007).
8. Jane A. Fisher, Disclosure of Safely and Effectiveness Data under the Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, 41 FOOD, DRUG CosM. L.J. 268, 270 (1986)
(setting down the historical basis of FDA's interpretation and implementation of the trade
secrets doctrine to data) ("Since 1938, FDA has consistently interpreted section 301(j) of the
FDCA as encompassing animal and human test data in an NDA, in spite of the law's literal
limitation to 'methods and processes.' ").
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weaken the underlying rationale for secrecy,9 the FDA has continued to
treat research data as confidential.'0
A strong argument against a default posture of confidentiality is that
research data disclosure would promote broad public interests by elimi-
nating the societal costs brought about by keeping research data out of
the reach of the public. Merck's eventual withdrawal of Vioxx implicates
secrecy as a major factor in the failure of the regulatory process to pro-
tect the public health. Civil action plaintiffs in Vioxx cases have
demonstrated the detrimental impact of a lack of public access to re-
search data about Vioxx's side-effects." Substantial evidence shows that
the public health debacle in the Vioxx cases resulted from a combination
of failures-Merck's inadequate dissemination and misleading interpre-
tation of Vioxx trial results, the FDA's decision to grant Vioxx "fast-
track" approval without a complete and full study of phase III trials, and
post-approval delays in communicating the drug's cardiovascular risks to
health care providers and consumers."
The Vioxx incident is not the only example of the costs of a blanket
policy of secrecy.'3 Nor is preventing a public health disaster the only (or
even the most significant) goal a policy of disclosure would serve. Re-
search data, due to rapid and far-reaching advances in the life sciences,
has grown exponentially more complex and information-rich in the last
two decades. So, too, has data analysis methodology, giving rise to a
brand new field-bioinformatics. The tremendous increases in the size
and information content of research data, coupled with recent break-
throughs in bioinformatics, present a chance to capture innovation
efficiencies that were previously impossible. These efficiencies will
largely remain uncaptured under a policy of secrecy that prevents infor-
matics based analyses of increasingly large datasets submitted to the
FDA. Public access to research data could therefore potentially yield
much valuable new information, aid the development of new products
9. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub L. No.
98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) [hereinafter Hatch-Waxman Act]. The Hatch-Waxman Act radi-
cally changed the drug certification process by allowing manufacturers of generic drugs to
gain FDA approval without having to conduct separate tests. Generic drugs may now rely on
an innovator drug's previously approved application and the data submitted in support of that
application to gain marketing approval for a "bioequivalent" product.
10. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
II. Proof of Injury Resulting From Prescription Medication Vioxx, 87 AM. .UR. 3D
Proof of Facts §§ 2-3 (2008).
12. Id. See also id. § 19 (reciting evidence presented at trials against Merck).
13. See Sidney A. Shapiro, Divorcing Profit from New Drug Research: A Consideration
of Proposals to Provide FDA with Reliable Test Data, 1978 DUKE L. J. 155, 166-68 (1978)
(describing several earlier incidents where trial results were manufactured or misrepresented).
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and greatly increase the quality of available information on existing
products. 4
Congress weakened the legitimacy of the nondisclosure argument by
enacting the Hatch-Waxman Act.'5 Thus, after the Hatch-Waxman Act,
the justification for continued secrecy based on the residual commercial
value of research data is substantially weaker. The FDA may and should
take into account the realignment of interests to revise its confidentiality
policy to a default position of disclosure as a matter of public policy. If
the FDA fails to act, Congress should explicitly require the agency to
make research data publicly accessible, notwithstanding any residual
value of the data or its status as confidential business information.
This Note proceeds in six parts. Part I begins by first analyzing the
theoretical underpinnings of pro-disclosure and pro-secrecy arguments.
The problems raised by a policy of research data confidentiality in drug
regulation are complex and located within the larger doctrinal question
posed by interjecting trade secrets into regulatory frameworks-a "big
picture" topic on which a substantial body of scholarship already exists.1
6
Here, I do not elaborate on these larger topics, except to summarize ex-
isting literature and highlight its relevance to this Note. Part II explores
the FDA's evaluation of pro-disclosure and pro-secrecy arguments, its
basis for preferring a pro-secrecy stance in its rules implementing the
Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), as well as its response to the
Hatch-Waxman Act's research data disclosure provisions. Part III
switches to a survey of the current state of research data confidentiality
by discussing how courts have analyzed and evaluated disclosure re-
quests under the FOIA. Part IV concludes the survey of the legal regime
of disclosure by briefly exploring statutory and constitutional restraints
in addition to the FOIA. Part V reveals the increasing costs of keeping
research data confidential by highlighting the heretofore unachievable
innovation efficiencies that would become possible under a regime of
14. See infra Part IV.
15. See discussion of the Hatch-Waxman Act's effect, or lack thereof, on data disclosure
infra Part lI.B.
16. Trade secrets, with their origins in and emphasis on interactions between private
parties, provoke an inherent incongruity in regulatory contexts, where the relevant interests
and motivations are of a decidedly public nature. E.g., David S. Levine, Secrecy and Unac-
countability: Trade Secrets in our Public Infrastructure, 59 FLA. L. REV. 135, 136-37, 148-
50, 162-63 (2007); Mary L. Lyndon, Secrecy and Access in an Innovation Intensive Economy:
Reordering Information Privileges in Environmental, Health, and Safety Low, 78 U. COLO. L.
REV. 465, 491-93, 496 (2007). Scholars have already identified data disclosure as a means to
promoting goals such as managing the health risks of drugs, preventing costly repetitions of
failed drug trials, and allowing better oversight of agency regulation. See Shapiro, supra note
13, at 156-58 (providing background on the problems caused by treating research data as
trade secrets and the salutary effects of data disclosure).
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public access. It focuses on the public interest in ensuring a high stan-
dard of scientific quality and integrity in research data, and on the
benefits of maximizing our understanding of a drug's mechanism of ac-
tion and side effects. Finally, Part VI briefly sketches current efforts to
achieve full research data disclosure by both private parties and legisla-
tures and points out some means of obtaining that goal.
I. WHY SECRECY, WHEREFORE DISCLOSURE?
Data disclosure is a discretionary function of all agencies. 7 In re-
sponding to disclosure requests, the FDA must balance the private,
commercial needs of drug manufacturers with the public interest in vig-
orous and accurate safety and efficacy research. 8  Therefore,
understanding the underlying interests that drive the debate is essential
in order to properly evaluate the arguments for and against research data
disclosure.' 9
A. The Nature of Manufacturers'Interests
Manufacturers have legitimate commercial interests in research data
secrecy. As drug development cycles have lengthened, the patent exclu-
sivity term has become increasingly inadequate20 and less able to provide
monopoly profits. Moreover, increasing numbers of drugs lack patent
protection because of expired or invalidated patents.' Manufacturers
have responded to eroding patent protection by expanding their patents
to new uses of older compounds or for newer versions of patent-expired
drugs under various "evergreening" strategies 2 In general, these solu-
17. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 290-94 (1979) (holding that the Free-
dom of Information Act disclosure exemptions do not impose a duty to withhold information
regarding a government agency).
18. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 13, at 156-57 (raising ethical and accuracy concerns
with sponsor produced research data). But see Kuhlik, supra note 4, at 96-97 ("The prospect
of earning substantial revenues for successful drugs is a necessary incentive to encourage
[research and development] investments.").
19. The FDA's data disclosure policy is necessarily located within the larger general
debate between trade secrets in regulatory frameworks. Though I focus only on the narrower
and more specific public interest in data accessibility here, I have organized this Note around
the existing theoretical basis of the larger debate. See supra note 16 and associated text.
20. See Kuhlik, supra note 4, at 96-97 (comparing the effective life of pharmaceutical
patents with patents in other industries and claiming that pharmaceutical patents' effective
lives are shorter by 6.5-7.5 years on average).
21. Many drug patents fail the high bars of nonobviousness and novelty. See 35 U.S.C.
§§ 101-103 (2006).
22. JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PATENT "EVERGREENING": ISSUES IN
INNOVATION AND COMPETITION, I (2009) (defining "evergreening" as generally "obtaining
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tions have not fared well in courts and may not provide as rigorous pro-
tection as the patentee would like.2 Moreover, even effective patents
may not offer complete protection since they are subject to competition
from non-infringing substitutes. One survey found that the mean time to
24
market for substitutes of seven therapeutic drugs was only three years.
While the patent system has arguably lost its position as the driving
force behind pharmaceutical innovation,25 the FDA's regulatory frame-
work has taken on a larger role in allowing manufacturers to maintain
their competitiveness.
Regulatory burdens delay competing and generic products from en-
tering the market. Lead time to market can provide a substantial
commercial advantage. Federal Trade Commission studies show that
doctors continue to prefer pioneer drugs even after substitutes become
available.26 Studies also show that the availability of new risk informa-
tion about an existing drug may have "no [discernible] effect on
prescribing behavior."27 To generate market lead time for a pioneer drug
with a long development cycle, or a variant of a drug which is about to
lose patent protection, manufacturers may resort to FDA-administered
exclusivity." Research data secrecy may delay or even prevent competi-
tors from obtaining marketing approval during the long development
phase. For approved products, unavailability of research data still delays
competing generic products from entering the market. Thus, manufac-
turers value research data to the extent that it enables first-to-market
products and delays the entry of competing generics.
Even if the domestic regulatory burden for new entries may have ar-
guably decreased following the Hatch-Waxman Act, research data
generated domestically may still retain anti-competitive value in other
markets. For example, research data may be used to obtain regulatory ap-
proval in foreign applications. It may be even more valuable in markets
where regulators do not permit generics to be marketed without separate
trials.2 9 Therefore, in a regime that favors disclosure, competitors may still
multiple patents that cover different aspects of the same product" that critics charge may "ef-
fectively extend[] the term of exclusivity that the patent holder obtains").
23. Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 349.
24. Thomas 0. McGarity, The Trade Secret Status of Health and Safety Testing Infor-
mation: Reforming Agency Disclosure Policies, 93 HARV. L. REV. 837, 851 (1980).
25. Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 347 ("Framing the relationship between patents and
drug regulation in this manner is seriously incomplete and out of date.").
26. McGarity, supra note 24, at 852.
27. LARS NOAH, LAW, MEDICINE, AND MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY: CASES AND MATERIALS
339 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 2nd ed. 2007).
28. See Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 359-62 (detailing the role of FDA-administered
"pseudo-patents" in delaying market entry for competing drugs).
29. See O'Reilly, supra note 2, at 23.
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be able to free ride on a manufacturer's U.S. research data in order to
gain approval in foreign markets.
Manufacturers also value research data secrecy as a way to minimize
third-party scrutiny of the side effects and risks of their products. A
manufacturer may even consider secrecy as a necessary means to reduce
their exposure to liability.' Moreover, competitors may benefit from ac-
cess when it enables them to gather information about a manufacturer's
drug in order to highlight the weaknesses of that product and "the rela-
tive virtues of [their] competing products.""
Finally, research data is valuable from a purely scientific perspec-
tive. Such data from current studies contains information useful for
designing future studies and channeling future development of improved
versions of the same drug, or even new drugs in the same class of com-
pound,32 Thus, manufacturers prize research data secrecy even after it
loses its "commercial utility ... as a means of excluding competitors
[from U.S. markets]."33
B. The Nature of the Public Interest4
Existing scholarship frames the public interest in disclosure as cen-
tering on the need to ensure and maintain data integrity and quality.
The FDA is not able to carry out perfect audits. 3 Time pressures and
lack of resources often prevent a thorough review of agency decisions,
even when existing research data could probably benefit from a reevalu-
ation in light of new scientific information or emerging methodologies. 6
Moreover, research data may not always meet the objectivity standards
of the scientific process, while still "falling short of being clearly fraudu-
lent or dishonest."37 Even when manufacturers employ outside academic
researchers to test drugs, neither the impartiality of the research nor an
30. See Lyndon, supra note 16, at 520-2 1.
31. See Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 383.
32. O'Reilly, supra note 2, at 24.
33. Id. at 21-25.
34. This section briefly summarizes the nature of the public interest and is only meant
to introduce and frame the issue that is the focus of this Note. I fully explore the recent expan-
sion of the need for disclosure in light of recent scientific breakthroughs in Part V.
35. Shapiro, supra note 13, at 158 ("[FDA reviewers] find it impossible ... to review
every page of the submitted information.").
36. McGarity, supra note 24, at 841.
37. See Wendy Wagner & David Michaels, Equal Treatment for Regulatory Science:
Extending the Controls Governing the Quality of Public Research to Private Research, 30 AM.
J.L. & MED. 119, 122-25 (2004).
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objective review of the process is guaranteed. In fact, manufacturers are
able to influence the results of academic studies in many ways."
Manufacturers are also able to suppress adverse results. For exam-
ple, a comparison study of trials published in peer-reviewed journals and
actual trial results revealed a clear publication bias, with positive results
more likely to be published. When negative results were included in
published peer-reviewed articles, they were still presented in ways to
highlight positive outcomes.4' Since withholding results is almost always
at the discretion of the manufacturer, it is difficult to detect the preva-
lence of "ends-oriented bias"42 in publications except through similar
serendipitous comparative studies. Proposals addressing this problem
have ranged from limited or complete third party testing, to government
43
sponsored testing, to full and public disclosure. Many scholars agree
that public disclosure would be the best means to improve research data
integrity and quality.44
Just as manufacturers are increasingly turning to secrecy in order to
protect their commercial interests, the need for disclosure is growing
concomitantly. 4 ' As tension mounts between the commercial interests for
secrecy and the need for public disclosure because the intellectual foun-
dation on which the confidentiality discourse has been based is
increasingly becoming outdated,46 it is helpful to understand the cur-
rently fragmented and confusing research data disclosure regime
resulting from historical interactions regarding disclosure and secrecy
between the FDA, courts, and Congress.
38. Id. at 120 ("As long as sponsors control the research at some or all points in the
process ... experiments can be biased in ways that support the sponsor's interests.").
39. Shapiro, supra note 13, at 164 (describing how academic clinical research is influ-
enced by industry, and quoting an industry person who "spent 6 years influencing clinical
investigators" as saying that "objectivity can be destroyed more frequently and effectively by
the soft sell than by the bribe.").
40. Erick H. Turner, et al., Selective Publication of Antidepressant Trials and Its Influ-
ence on Apparent Efficacy, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 252, 256-57 (2008).
41. Id.
42. Wagner & Michaels, supra note 37, at 123-25.
43. Shapiro, supra note 13, at 175-77. According to Professor Shapiro, the FDA has at
least once required testing by third parties and public review of the results in the past because
of public "sharp [scrutiny]"of a product (Aspartame). Id. at 175.
44. E.g., Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 383; Lyndon, supra note 16, at 523; McGarity,
supra note 24, at 840.
45. Lyndon, supra note 16, at 480-81. ("Commercial interests in controlling informa-
tion seem to be growing at the same time [data] access is becoming both more necessary and
more productive.")
46. See infra Part V.
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II. THE STATE OF THE LAW WITH RESPECT TO RESEARCH DATA
DISCLOSURE-THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
Current laws governing research data disclosure are a "tangle" that
"both encourage and discourage disclosure."47 Applicable provisions are
scattered throughout the FOIA, the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetics
Act ("FDCA") and the Federal Trade Secrets Act ("FTSA"), as well as
in state trade secret law based on common law, constitutional takings
doctrine, and agency regulations.48 This confusing, complicated, and
sometimes contradictory regime contributes to the creation of legal bot-
tlenecks. It allows manufacturers to successfully resist disclosure by
arguing for a narrow interpretation of conflicting statutory provisions
and unclear terminology.49 On the whole, this strategy has succeeded and
disclosure efforts have been severely curtailed by restrictive judicial in-
terpretation, as well as by consistently pro-secrecy agency regulations.
Perhaps because disclosure controversies have been raised as FOIA re-
quests,o courts have not been able to consider the rationale behind the
drug regulatory regime properly. They have concentrated excessively on
the potential harm to private interests and insufficiently on the public
interest in disclosure.'
A. The FDA's Implementation of the Freedom of Information Act
The FDA's application of the trade secret doctrine is "derived from
its interpretation of the interaction of three separate statutory provi-
sions;" 2 however, almost all controversies over research data disclosure
have turned on the FDA's construction of the FOIA. When the FDA first
published regulations on its FOIA policy, it concluded that "it [was] not
practical or feasible to determine the differences, if any, between the
confidentiality provisions [in the different statutes].""3 Arguing that "to
47. McGarity, supra note 24, at 858.
48. See Stanley S. Wang & John J. Smith, Potential Legal Barriers to Increasing
CMS/FDA Collaboration: The Law of Trade Secrets and Related Considerations, 58 Foot &
DRUG L.J. 613, 620-24 (2004).
49. See infra Part III.B for an example where drug manufacturer Schering successfully
resisted disclosure by arguing for a narrow interpretation of otherwise facially pro-disclosure
statutory provisions.
50. See infra notes 53, 62.
51. See infra Part Ill.
52. Fisher, supra note 8, at 270 (setting down the historical basis of the FDA's trade
secrets doctrine).
53. Food and Drug Administration, Public Information, 39 Fed. Reg 44,602, 44,612,
178 (Dec. 24, 1974) [hereinafter FDA Regulations]. Note that this could possibly be an im-
proper construction of the statutory provision in Section 301(j) of the FDCA, which imposes
criminal penalties for "revealing ... any method or process which as a trade secret is entitled
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do otherwise would invite confusion [and] lead to arbitrary decisions,"
the FDA decided to treat all three statutes as coextensive and base all its
future disclosure decisions on its construction of the FOIA.'
Designed to "pierce the veil of administrative secrecy and to open
agency action to the light of public scrutiny, 5  the FOIA imposes a gen-
eral obligation for information disclosure on federal agencies. As a
result, the FOIA caused a radical increase in transparency at the FDA. 6
The FDA Commissioner concluded that the new, disclosure-friendly re-
gime had "a beneficial rather than a detrimental effect" and "fostered
greater public accountability."" Despite its otherwise pro-disclosure ef-
fect, the FOIA has not increased access to research data due to the FDA's
determination to treat such data as private, trade secret, and confidential,
and thus exempt from disclosure. While it noted that research data dis-
closure and trade secrets were the most contentious issues raised by its
proposed FOIA regulations, 9 the FDA decided that the contents of
NDAs were "private" rather than "public" records ° and would therefore
be exempt from disclosure under the trade secret exemption of the FOIA
("Exemption 4',)6' . The FDA eventually promulgated this policy under
several rules 2
The FDA's reason for arriving at this conclusion has shaped the de-
velopment and application of the trade secret doctrine within the context
of the drug regulatory regime. The agency's responses to the various
to protection." 21 U.S.C. § 331(j). There is at least a colorable argument that data do not con-
stitute "a method or process."
54. Id.
55. Dep't of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976).
56. In the two years after it implemented regulations complying with the FOIA
amendments, the proportion of records that the FDA treated as confidential decreased from 90
to 10 percent. FDA Regulations, supra note 53, at 44,602, 1.
57. Id.
58. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) provides that the FOIA disclosure requirement does not extend
to "trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privi-
leged or confidential." Id.
59. FDA Regulations, supra note 53, at 44,611 ("By far the most extensive comment on
the proposed regulations related to the definitions of 'trade secret' and 'confidential data or
information' "); id. at 44,635 ("Undoubtedly the most persistent issue raised in the comments
relates to the disclosure of safety and effectiveness data in IND and NDA files.").
60. Id. at 44,633, 1 238 ("[Tlhese applications, and the notices relating to investiga-
tional use of new drugs, result in private licenses rather than public regulations. Accordingly, it
was concluded that the safety and effectiveness data for new drugs and new animal drugs,
including antibiotic drugs for veterinary use, fall within the trade secrets exemption and thus
are not available for public disclosure.").
61. The trade secret exemption is usually referred to as "Exemption 4" since it is sub-
clause 4 of 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).
62. 21 C.FR. § 20.60 (2010) (FOIA exemptions control all other disclosure rules); 21
C.F.R. § 20.61 (2010) (data which fall under FOIA exemptions are not available for public
disclosure); 21 C.F.R. § 314.430 (2010) (setting forth conditions under which information in
new drug applications becomes available for public disclosure).
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comments it received during its FOIA rulemaking illustrate the tensions
the doctrine raises in a public disclosure context. On the one hand, the
agency claimed that research data contained economic value, which
would be endangered if disclosed . In responding to a comment which
emphasized the safety of human test subjects in clinical trials, the FDA
stated that "[tlhe remedy for the individual who has participated in the
testing of a new drug is to obtain information about the drug from the
drug company involved."64 In responding to requests that INDs not be
terminated, specifically in order to prevent disclosure following such
termination, the FDA advised manufacturers that "the termination of an
IND is not dispositive with respect to the availability of information con-
tained therein. If the company can demonstrate that the matter is still
under active development, such information will retain its trade secret
status. '6' These comments are consistent with a purely commercial and
private reading of the interests involved.
On the other hand, the FDA Commissioner praised the FOIA's open
disclosure policy and went on to recommend that "greater use should be
made in the future of the Commissioner's discretionary authority to re-
lease agency records which, under the strict terms of the statute, could be
retained as confidential." While the agency appeared to confirm that
public policy favored research data disclosure, 7 it refused to do so, argu-
ing that disclosure would harm pharmaceutical innovation by allowing
free riders to obtain approval of identical products after an innovator has
shouldered the regulatory burden.6 8 This is a privately oriented policy
and conflates private interests (competition between drug manufacturers)
with several public interests (research data access and maintaining the
correct incentives for pharmaceutical innovation). Acknowledging the
conflicting forces it had to accommodate, the FDA argued that this issue
was too important to be addressed by the agency's rulemaking powers
63. FDA Regulations, supra note 53, at 44,634, 252 ("[Tlhere can be no question,
under present law, about the tremendous economic value of the full reports of the safety and
effectiveness data contained in an IND [or] NDA ... If a manufacturer's safety and effective-
ness data are to be released upon request, thus permitting 'me-too' drugs to be marketed
immediately, it is entirely possible that the incentive for private pharmaceutical research will
be adversely affected.").
64. Id. at 44,633.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 44,402.
67. Id. at 44,635 ("The Commissioner agrees that public policy supports release of all
safety and effectiveness data, but points out that present statutory law, 18 U.S.C. 1905 and 21
U.S.C. 331(j), prohibits such release.").
68. See FDA Regulations, supra note 53, at 44,634, 1 252.
FDA Should Disclose Drug Trial Data
and pleaded with Congress to remedy the situation.' Congress heard;
and, ten years later, it attempted to answer.
B. The Hatch- Waxman Act's Apparent Attempt to
Authorize Research Data Disclosure
In 1984, Congress passed the Hatch-Waxman Act, significantly
changing the relationship between pioneer drugs, generics, patents and
FDA regulation.70 Fully exploring the contours of the compromise that
animated the Hatch-Waxman Act, and its impact, is a task beyond the
scope of this Note]' For the present, it is sufficient to note that the
Hatch-Waxman Act created an abbreviated approval process for generic
drugs which explicitly allowed them to rely on research data generated
by another manufacturer for a bioequivalent pioneer drug.72 Thus, the
Hatch-Waxman Act removed one of the main objections against disclo-
sure by reducing the value of research data as a means to gain regulatory
approval. 71 In addition, the Hatch-Waxman Act took another reasonable
step: it made research data explicitly available to the public after the
need for secrecy had disappeared. The Hatch-Waxman Act amended
Section 505 of the FDCA to add the following provision:
Safety and effectiveness data and information which has been
submitted in an application under subsection (b) . . . shall be
made available to the public, upon request, unless extraordinary
circumstances are shown-
(A) if no work is being or will be undertaken to have the appli-
cation approved,
(B) if the Secretary has determined that the application is not
approvable and all legal appeals have been exhausted,
69. Id. at 44,612, 78 ("The [FDA] has on numerous occasions testified before Con-
gress that current statutory provisions prevent disclosure of useful information ... The [FDA]
cannot change the law, and thus is bound by the present provisions until Congress acts."); id.
at 44,614, 1 90 ("The Commissioner concludes that it is Congress which weighs the need for
the release of certain information against the need for retaining it as confidential.").
70. See Hatch-Waxman Act, supra note 9.
71. Extensive scholarship covers this topic, For a competent summary, see Holly
Soehnge, The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984: Fine-Tuning
the Balance Between the Interests of Pioneer and Generic Drug Manufacturers, 58 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 51 (2003) (explaining the purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act as an attempt to cor-
rect the perceived imbalances between brand name manufacturers and generics while decrying
the abilities of both sides to bypass the Act's strictures).
72. See 21 U.S.C. § 3550) (2006).
73. O'Reilly, supra note 2, at 21; Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 381.
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(C) if approval of the application ... is withdrawn and all legal
appeals have been exhausted,
(D) if the Secretary has determined that such drug is not a new
drug, or
(E) upon the effective date of the approval of the first application
under subsection (j) of this section which refers to such drug or
upon the date upon which the approval of an application under
subsection (j) of this section which refers to such drug could be
made effective if such an application had been submitted.
74
These provisions require the disclosure of research data when an
NDA is not approvable" or becomes abandoned,76 or upon the approval
of a generic drug which depended on original research data, or at the
earliest date such a generic could have been approved." In other words,
research data must be disclosed when it no longer constitutes an anti-
competitive barrier. On the face of the legislative language, one might
have thought that Congress had solved the problem-as soon as there
was no longer any commercial need for secrecy, all research data would be
publicly available. Especially in light of the FDA's previous request that
Congress "weigh the need for [research data disclosure], ' 7" it seemed that
Congress had decided in favor of disclosure. The manufacturers viewed
the Hatch-Waxman Act as an underhanded attempt to implement disclo-
sure regime by "disclosure advocates. '"79 Despite admittedly acting with
that goal, Congress was not as clear about disclosure as it could have been.
At the last moment, the sponsors of the Hatch-Waxman Act, perhaps due
to a fundamental disagreement about the nature and role of trade secrets in
disclosure policy,"' inserted an exception to the general rule of disclosure.8'
Secrecy would continue to operate if a manufacturer could show that
"extraordinary circumstances" applied to the release of research data. This
74. 21 U.S.C. § 355(l)(l) (2006) (emphasis added).
75. Id. at § 355(l)(l)(B), § 355(l)(I)(D).
76. Id. at § 355(l)(l)(A), § 355(l)(l)(C).
77. Id. at § 355(l)(l)(E).
78. FDA Regulations, supra note 53, at 44,614, 1 90.
79. See O'Reilly, supra note 2, at 16 ("Advocates of drug data disclosure acted quietly
in attaching a full disclosure provision, buried amidst many unrelated and controversial provi-
sions, to the pending legislation").
80. Id. at 18 ("Maneuvering in a field of ambiguity and mutual mistrust, the drafters of
the 1984 Act settled upon the term 'extraordinary circumstances' on the false impression that
it represented current FDA policy on data disclosure of live data.").
81. 21 U.S.C. § 355(l)(I) (2006) (Data "shall be made available to the public, upon
request, unless extraordinary circumstances are shown.") (emphasis added).
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language was "unexpected and ambiguous. The ambiguity allowed the
argument that any residual value a manufacturer could derive from re-
search data, even after the FDA approved a generic version of a drug,
constituted extraordinary circumstances. Senator Hatch bolstered this
argument by noting that this reading of "extraordinary circumstances"
simply recapitulated long-standing FDA policy. 8' The FDA confirmed
this position. The FDA Commissioner declared that the "extraordinary
circumstances" standard was identical to that for Exemption 4.84 Thus the
exception swallowed the rule.
The current state of the law rests on what "trade secrets" and "confi-
dential information" mean within the context of FOIA Exemption 4.
Therefore, I turn to the courts' contribution to our understanding of these
terms.
III. COURTS' STRUGGLE TO ELUCIDATE THE SCOPE OF
TRADE SECRETS UNDER THE FOIA
A. A Trade Secret by Any Other Name Would Smell Just as Sweet
The Supreme Court has held that Exemption 4 is not an absolute bar
to disclosure. 5 Rather, it only limits an agency's obligation to disclose.86
The Court instructed lower courts to balance the private and public inter-
est in determining whether disclosure is appropriate under the FOIA
exemptions." In spite of Chrysler Corp.'s balancing approach, lower
82. O'Reilly, supra note 2, at 17.
83. Id. at 19-22. Interestingly, this colloquy seems to have taken place after the Senate
voted on and approved the final version of the Act.
84. 130 CONG. REC. S10981-90 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1984) (letter from Frank Young,
FDA Commissioner to Senator Orrin Hatch.) ("[T]he meaning of 'extraordinary circum-
stances' in the bill ... is meant to conform the agency's disclosure standard with that of
exemption (4)."). Part Il.A, infra, investigates how courts have contributed to the development
of the agency's disclosure standard for confidential information.
85. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 291 (1979) ("Chrysler contends that the
nine exemptions in general, and Exemption 4 in particular, reflect a sensitivity to the privacy
interests of private individuals and nongovernmental entities. That contention may be con-
ceded without inexorably requiring the conclusion that the exemptions impose affirmative
duties on an agency to withhold information sought. In fact, that conclusion is not supported
by the language, logic, or history of the Act.").
86. Id. at 293 ("[T]he FOIA by itself protects the submitters' interest in confidentiality
only to the extent that this interest is endorsed by the agency collecting the information.").
87. Id. ("Enlarged access to governmental information undoubtedly cuts against the
privacy concerns of nongovernmental entities, and as a matter of policy some balancing and
accommodation may well be desirable.") This conclusion is also supported by the Court's
approach in evaluating other FOIA exemptions. See, e.g., Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v.
Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 172 (2004) ("The statutory direction that the information not be
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courts have not adequately considered the public interest in disclosure
when considering attempts to access research data held by the FDA."
Courts have been willing to compel disclosure only for records that are
directly relevant to opening governmental actions to public scrutiny.
Since research data is inextricably linked with private parties' interests,
courts have failed to undertake the balancing of interests that a plausible
reading of Chrysler Corp. would suggest.
89
Part of the difficulty in correctly gauging the proper scope of Ex-
emption 4 begins with the fact that the statute does not define the term
"trade secret." The lack of a definition of "trade secret" was the central
dispute in a case involving a FOIA request that the nonprofit consumer
advocacy group Public Citizen submitted to the FDA for research data
concerning intraocular lenses ("IOL").90 Noting that the common law
supplied two different definitions for "trade secret," the D.C. Circuit re-
jected the broader of the two definitions set forth by the Restatement of
Torts, adopted by the FDA, 9' and sanctioned by the district court.92 To the
D.C. Circuit, this broad definition, where "a trade secret can be any in-
formation used in a business which gives competitive advantage," meant
that "there is little or no information left that could qualify as commer-
cial or financial information under the second category of the exemption
without also qualifying as a trade secret."9'3 The court instead adopted a
narrower definition of a trade secret. 4 In doing so, it focused on the pri-
vate law context in which the broader definition evolved, correctly
noting that "the Restatement definition, tailored as it is to protecting
released if the invasion of personal privacy could reasonably be expected to be unwarranted
requires the courts to balance the competing interests in privacy and disclosure.").
88. See Janene Boyce, Disclosure of Clinical Trial Data: Why Exemption 4 of the Free-
don of Information Act Should Be Restored, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 3, 16-18 (2005).
89. Peter Lurie & Allison Zieve, Sometimes the Silence can be Like the Thunder: Ac-
cess to Pharmaceutical Data at FDA, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 85, 91 (2006) ("The
confidential commercial exemption does not authorize the courts to weigh the public interest
in disclosure against the potential competitive harm that disclosure may cause.").
90. Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v. Food & Drug Admin., 704 F.2d 1280, 1282-
86 (D.C. Cir. 1983) [hereinafter Public Citizen I].
91. Id. at 1284 n.7 (citing 4 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939)) (de-
fining a trade secret as information that may "consist of any formula, pattern, device or
compilation of information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportu-
nity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it.").
92. Id. at 1287-88.
93. Id. at 1289 (quoting the House Comm. on Government Operations, Freedom of
Information Act Requests for Business Data and Reverse-FOIA Lawsuits, H.R. REP. No. 95-
1382, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1978)).
94. Id. at 1288 ("[A] secret, commercially valuable plan, formula, process, or device
that is used for the making, preparing, compounding, or processing of trade commodities and
that can be said to be the end product of either innovation or substantial effort*"). The court
apparently adopted this view of a trade secret from Canadian law. O'Reilly, supra note 2, at
n.69.
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businesses from breaches of contract and confidence by departing em-
ployees and others under fiduciary obligations is ill-suited for the public
law context in which FOIA determinations must be made."9' In a foot-
note, the court further elaborated on balancing the public need for
disclosure with private interests, concluding that "lumping health and
safety testing data with all other types of proprietary information is in-
herently suspect '"96
After holding that research data were not "trade secrets" within the
meaning of Exemption 4, the court evaluated whether such data were
"commercial or financial . . . and privileged or confidential." 97 The court
rejected Public Citizen's argument that the exemption for commercial or
financial information should be limited to information which in fact re-
vealed commercial operations, holding that "commercial," within its
ordinary meaning, extended to "documentation of the health and safety
experience of [manufacturers'] products. '98 The relevant question then
became "whether the commercial information submitted to the FDA by
the IOL manufacturers [was] 'confidential' within the meaning of Ex-
emption 4."99 In deciding this issue, the court noted that case law has
developed a two-prong test, based on whether disclosure is likely either:
"(1) to impair the government's ability to obtain necessary information
in the future, or (2) to cause substantial harm to the competitive position
of the person from whom the information was obtained."' ° Only the sec-
ond prong of the test applies with respect to research data since
manufacturers must disclose such data in order to obtain marketing ap-
proval. The court held that because the manufacturers had provided
depositions which documented potential competitive injury, testimony
which Public Citizen was not able to refute, Exemption 4 still applied.
Therefore, summary judgment in favor of the manufacturers was appro-
priate.'"'
With the Public Citizen I decision, the D.C. Circuit adopted a defini-
tion of confidentiality very close, if not identical, to the broader
definition of trade secret that it had just rejected in the same opinion.
Under this standard, manufacturers should almost always be able to
show that release of research data will cause them competitive harm. The
court qualified its definition of substantial harm as "harm flowing from
95. Public Citizen 1, supra note 90, at 1289.
96. Id. at 1288 n.25.
97. Id. at 1290.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1290-91.
101. Id. at 1291.
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the affirmative use of proprietary information by competitors,''  2 which
is arguably somewhat narrower than the Restatement definition of a
trade secret. In the context of research data, however, this is a distinction
without a difference, since existence of competitors who can derive some
commercial benefit from data access is a given in the pharmaceutical
industry. The court had started its inquiry with the question of whether
the trade secret definition was too broad.' °3 The question after Public
Citizen I is whether there is any research data left that could qualify nei-
ther as "commercial or financial information" nor as "a trade secret."
Under the confidentiality standard the court adopted, the answer appears
to be no.
Lower court decisions applying the confidentiality standard illustrate
the ease with which manufacturers can meet the competitive harm re-
quirement. In one such decision, the district court, following Public
Citizen I, held that research data was exempt from a FOIA request under
the second prong of Exemption 4. '°' The court had no difficulty in con-
cluding that "actual competition in the drug business is evident," because
"only a small fraction" of drug applications would "ultimately receive
approval from the FDA," and that "actual competition [existed] among
manufacturers seeking approval to market the drug in 'generic' form"
even after approval. °5 The court based its refusal on the FDA's declara-
tion that a competitor in possession of raw research data and results
"could also use the information to submit its own NDA to FDA for the
same or similar drug product. This would therefore likely cause substan-
tial competitive harm to Lilly."'6 Since these set of circumstances
describe almost every pending IND or NDA, any manufacturer should be
able to resist disclosure by asserting that some competitor can derive
some benefit from accessing its research data. Thus, research data easily
becomes confidential and therefore exempt from disclosure.
But what of the balancing of interests encouraged by the Court in
Chrysler Corp.? Courts applying the confidentiality standard will often
stop after competitive harm in disclosure has been established for the
manufacturer. The magnitude of that harm against the weight of the pub-
102. Id. at 1291, n.30.
103. Id. at 1289 ("[T]here is little or no information left that could qualify as commercial
or financial information under the second category of the exemption without also qualifying as
a trade secret.") (quoting the House Comm. on Government Operations, Freedom of Informa-
tion Act Requests for Business Data and Reverse-FOIA Lawsuits, H.R. REP. No. 95-1382,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1978)).
104. Citizens Comm'n on Human Rights v. FDA, 1993 WL 1610471, at *9, 59-460
(C.D. Cal. 1993).
105. Id. at *8,155.
106. Id. at *9,159.
FDA Should Disclose Drug Trial Data
lic interest in disclosure is therefore often not considered by courts. Even
when they purport to balance it against private interests, courts fail to
consider the magnitude of the public interest. For example, in Public
Citizen Health Research Group v. Nat'l Inst. of Health, the D.C. District
Court refused to uphold the plaintiff's FOIA request for information on
royalties the National Institute of Health (NIH) received by licensing its
inventions to pharmaceutical companies since disclosing such informa-
tion would cause competitive harm to the companies.07 Disclosing
royalty information may indeed have caused competitive harm to the
companies that licensed technology from the NIH. The court, despite
claiming that it was engaging in "a rough balancing ... between private
and public interests,"'0 8 nonetheless failed to consider whether the plain-
tiff's asserted interest in "evaluat[ing] whether the government is
receiving a reasonable rate of return on the taxpayers' investment in the
valuable research done by the NIH"' ° would be a sufficient counter-
argument to the private interest in secrecy. Moreover, the court ruled that
the private interests prevailed on its conclusion that "the agency has sub-
stantially demonstrated that the effectiveness of the licensing program
would be critically impaired if the royalty information was released."' 0
The effectiveness of the NIH's licensing program implicates public as
well as private interests, a point which the court did not address. The
court ultimately failed to explain how this complex set of interests-the
NIH's interest in maintaining its licensing program, pharmaceutical
companies' interests in keeping the amount of royalties they pay to the
NIH secret, and the public interest in ensuring a fair return for taxpayer
financed technologies licensed to private companies-interacted or bal-
anced with each other. The confidentiality test thus appears to be
incapable of balancing interests because it focuses extensively on the
nature and magnitude of competitive harm to private interests and fails to
consider the extent or magnitude of the public interest.'
107. Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v. Nat'l Inst. of Health, 209 F.Supp. 2d 37, 51
(D.D.C. 2002) ("[Tlhe release of negotiated royalty terms of contracts ... would cause sub-
stantial competitive harm to submitting companies.")
108. Id. at 45.
109. Id. at41.
110. Id. at 54.
111. See supra note 85. See also Margaret Witherup Tindall, Breast Implant Information
as Trade Secrets: Another Look at FOIA 's Fourth Exemption, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 213, 221 -
31 (1993) (detailing the role of the trade secrets doctrine in preventing safety information on
breast implants from reaching the public, even after the FDA received thousands of complaints
about the implants).
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B. Courts' Construction of the Hatch- Waxman
Act's Disclosure Requirement
The arguably independent mandate for disclosure in the Hatch-
Waxman Act has become entangled with the FOIA and Exemption 4,"12
but the "extraordinary circumstances" exception, though asserted, has
not been judicially tested. ' 3 Moreover, the FDA does not apply the ex-
traordinary circumstances exception evenly. For example, the Hatch-
Waxman Act mandates disclosure of "abandoned NDAs,"1 4 as well as
NDAs for which a generic substitute has been or could theoretically be
approved.'" The FDA takes the position that the latter are not disclosable
because access to approved or pending NDAs constitutes competitive
harm and thus is an extraordinary circumstance. But in Davis v. Food
and Drug Administration, the FDA "conceded the disclosability of
[abandoned NDAs],' ' . and settled the case without arguing that aban-
doned NDAs contained residual value. This result may well be due to the
ability of a manufacturer "to make broad claims that it has not aban-
doned its efforts with respect to an NDA and thereby to thwart
disclosure.""' 7 NDA approval statistics support this observation. Only 97
of 1393 total NDA applications between FY 1993 and FY 2005, or less
than 7%, were withdrawn NDAs." 8 For comparison, there were 265 non-
approvable NDAs in the same period, about 19%. ''9 Since the decision to
withdraw is at the discretion of the manufacturer, an NDA is likely to be
abandoned only when the manufacturer has presumably decided that its
research data content has no residual value. A manufacturer therefore
sends a strong signal that they will be unlikely to contest the disclosure
of research data from abandoned NDAs.
On the other hand, the FDA resisted Public Citizen's attempt to rely
on the disclosure provisions of section 355(l) to compel the FDA to re-
lease "documents concerning pre-clinical and clinical studies for all
prescription drugs which had a discontinuance of the clinical trials be-
cause of death or serious injury of patients or because of safety concerns
112. See supra Part I I.B.
113. O'Reilly, supra note 2, at 24.
114. 21 U.S.C. § 355(I)(I)(A)-(D) (2006).
115. Id. at § 355(l)(l)(E).
116. Lurie & Zieve, supra note 89, at 94.
117. Id.
118. CDER, CDER First Action Performance for Original NDAs, http://www.fda.gov/
CDER/rdmt/histnda.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2007).
119. Of those, 165 (11.8% of total applications) cluster in the time period between FY
1993 and 1998.
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from pre-clinical studies."' 20 The FDA first refused to even acknowledge
whether it had any such records,' 2' and Public Citizen sued.'22 After the
district court ordered the FDA to "retrieve the INDs identified and re-
view them for responsiveness,"' 23 the agency found only fourteen out of
the 230 INDs filed within the requested time frame as responsive, but it
denied the request under Exemption 4. 24 The FDA asserted that "certain
information consisted of confidential commercial and/or trade secret
data and information, the public release of which would cause substan-
tial competitive harm to the sponsors of these INDs.""'2 The district court
held that the FDA and the remaining two manufacturers had established
that disclosure "would likely cause substantial competitive harm," but it
also held that the manufacturers had abandoned the INDs.' 26 After engag-
ing in a lengthy analysis and concluding that the Hatch-Waxman Act
amendments required disclosure of research data contained in abandoned
INDs, the district court ordered their release.'
2
After losing in the district court, the FDA and Schering, one of the
manufacturers, appealed to the D.C. Circuit. The FDA argued that Scher-
ing had provided evidence that it was using the research data contained
in the abandoned IND for a subsequent drug application. The FDA took
the position that Schering had proved competitive harm, which in turn
triggered the "extraordinary circumstances" exception' 28 and prevented
the FDA from releasing the INDs. Public Citizen asserted a public inter-
est in preventing re-testing of a drug "that had previously been found
harmful to human health."'2 9 Public Citizen also argued that Schering's
assertion of competitive harm would apply to "any drug sponsor who
discloses research on an abandoned drug,'""0 and thus there was nothing
extraordinary about Schering's circumstances. The court did not reach
120. Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v. Food & Drug Admin., 185 F.3d 898, 901
(D.C. Cir. 1999) [hereinafter Public Citizen Il].
121. Brief of Appellee Public Citizen Health Research Group at 7, Public Citizen Health
Res. Group v. Food & Drug Admin., 185 F.3d 898 (D.C. Cir 1999) (Nos. 98-5161, 98-5162)
[hereinafter Public Citizen Briefn.
122. Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v. Food & Drug Admin., 997 F. Supp. 56, 59
(D.D.C. 1998). Subsequently, four of the six manufacturers who had responsive INDs settled
with Public Citizen and agreed to release their research data.
123. Public Citizen Brief, supra note 12 1, at 7.
124. Final Brief for Appellant Food and Drug Administration at 4, Public Citizen Health
Research Group v. Food & Drug Admin., 185 F.3d 898 (D.C. Cir 1999) (Nos. 98-5161, 98-
5162), 1999 WL 34833581 [hereinafter FDA Brief].
125. Id.
126. Pub. Citizen Health Research Group, supra note 122, at 65-66.
127. See id. at 66-70.
128. FDA Brief, supra note 124, at 4.
129. Public Citizen Brief, supra note 121, at 9.
130. Id.
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the question of what Congress meant by "extraordinary circumstances"
because Schering made the threshold argument that an IND should be
distinguished from an NDA and that Section 355() applied only to
NDAs.'3 ' Interestingly, even though the FDA did not agree,3' the court
engaged in a "plain meaning" construction of Section 355(1), accepted
Schering's argument, and proceeded to distinguish INDs from NDAs
because "an IND ... is submitted under subsection (i), not subsection




Public Citizen also argued that the FOIA trade secret exemption
should not apply to abandoned INDs and attempted to convince the court
to balance the public interest "to determine whether the FDA was ade-
quately protecting trial subjects and to allow competitors to avert
potentially risky trials of related drugs."'" The court rejected that argu-
ment as well and adhered to a narrow construction of public interest.'
3 5
The court disallowed disclosure of all INDs except for one, holding that
there is no public interest in releasing Schering's research data so that
"other drug companies will not conduct risky clinical trials of the drugs
that Schering has abandoned," and because release of such data was not
"related to 'what the government is up to.' ,,136 The court flatly refused to
"consider Public Citizen's assertion that disclosure would in fact prevent
the exposure of human beings to a health risk.""'
Public Citizen H exemplifies the burden confidentiality places on the
FDA, tasked with guarding the public interest, and courts that are sup-
posed to interpret that interest's scope in reference to private interests
131. Final Brief of Appellant Schering Corporation at 13, Pub. Citizen Health Research
Group v. Food & Drug Admin., 185 F.3d 898 (D.C. Cir 1999) (Nos. 98-5161, 98-5162), 1999
WL 34833585.
132. Public Citizen Brief, supra note 12 1, at 12.
133. Public Citizen It, supra note 120, at 902 ("[Section] 355(l) by its terms applies only
to 'safety and effectiveness data and information' submitted in an NDA. Therefore, even if the
agency had interpreted the phrase 'subsection (b)' in § 355 to include information submitted in
an IND, we could not defer to that interpretation."). But when the FDA was formulating its
FOIA regulations, manufacturers requested, and the FDA agreed, that INDs should be treated
similarly to an NDA, specifically in order to prevent disclosure following IND termination.
See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
134. Lurie & Zieve, supra note 89, at 91.
135. Public Citizen II, supra note 120, at 904 ("We reject Public Citizen's proposal be-
cause a consequentialist approach to the public interest in disclosure is inconsistent with the
'balance of private and public interests' the Congress struck in Exemption 4' (quoting Critical
Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 975 F.2d 871, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en
banc)).
136. Id. (quoting Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S.
749, 773 (1989)).
137. Id. at 905.
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and the agency's policies. For example, when the court accepted Scher-
ing's argument that an IND is distinct from an NDA because it is filed
under a different subsection of Section 355, it did not follow the FDA's
long-standing practice, which has been to treat an IND and an NDA in-
corporating that IND as one continuous document.'38 Moreover, the court
was quick to dismiss the public interest in disclosure, perhaps because
the agency never articulated the strength of the disclosure interest. The
concurring judge emphasized the conclusory nature of the court's dis-
missal and pointed out that a balancing of interests should have been the
appropriate analysis. 9 At the same time, the court accepted another
long-standing FDA policy to accord research data confidential status. In
fact, this is one FDA policy that no court has been willing to disturb. At
least to the extent Public Citizen II embodies the courts' approach, it ex-
hibits altogether too high a deference to commercial, private interests at
the expense of the public interest.
C. The Exceptions Prove the Rule-Instances
of Court Ordered Disclosure
Some courts have compelled the FDA to disclose research data, but
have narrowly focused their decisions on a showing of a lack of private
harm. The Public Citizen II court ordered the release of one IND, which
was for "[an] isomer making up a prescription medicine currently mar-
keted by Schering." ' 40 The court's cursory conclusion that such
disclosure would not result in substantial competitive harm rested on
simply rejecting Schering's competitive harm argument. It is not clear
why the competitive harm argument failed for this particular IND, since
Schering made all of the arguments manufacturers usually make to es-
tablish substantial competitive harm.' 4' Despite being poorly reasoned,
138. See FDA Regulations, supra note 53, at 44,634, 1 248 (responding to a comment
that IND data should not be released upon the approval of an NDA application, the FDA
stated that "the IND and NDA are regarded as one continuous process. Indeed, the NDA in-
corporates the IND. Accordingly, upon the filing or approval of an NDA the material in the
IND has the same status as the material in the NDA.")
139. Public Citizen II, supra note 120, at 908 (Garland, J., concurring) ("Nor is this a
case where the legal conclusion the court has reached is indisputable. To the contrary, al-
though no party cited the relevant precedent on this point, we have twice held that Exemption
4 requires a balancing of the interest in nondisclosure 'against the public interest in disclo-
sure.' ") (citations omitted).
140. Id. at 906.
141. See id. (Schering argued that "disclosure would reveal substantial basic research, as
well as disease models that have been developed by Schering at a great expense, that toxicol-
ogy data have significant value beyond the compound under investigation, and would be
applicable to any drug product any of whose metabolites were identical or similar to those of
[their IND] and other drugs of a similar chemical type. [They further argued] that clinical
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the court's decision to release that specific IND nevertheless illustrates
the general rule: disclosure is only appropriate under a complete lack of
competitive harm. It may force disclosure of basic research information
from clinical trials of drugs in cases where the drugs' patent terms may
have expired or for any other drug for which the market is already com-
petitive. But that opening may also prove too narrow. A party resisting
disclosure could plausibly argue that any disclosure under the Public
Citizen II standard should be limited to the facts of the case, i.e., isomers
of currently marketed drugs and only basic research data.
In Teich, the court approved the disclosure of animal studies by the
manufacturer of silicone gel breast implants. 42 The court reasoned that
such disclosure would not cause substantial harm to the competitive po-
sition of the manufacturer due to the fact that the plaintiff requested
"only protocols and positive results" and "exclude[d] information con-
cerning [the manufacturer's] silicone gel product specifications,
marketing strategies, and names of individuals and independent contrac-
tors who participated in studies."' 43 Moreover, the requested animal
studies had been prepared for pre-approval and were twenty years old.
The Teich court did engage in a more vigorous balancing of the public
interest in disclosure with Dow Corning's interest in confidentiality, fo-
cusing on the risk to public health posed by the public's inability to
access research data." Ultimately, only an understanding that older stud-
ies are more likely to be suitable for disclosure allowed the court to
broadly construe the public interest.
This Court also notes that most of the studies at issue here were
prepared as much as 20 years ago. It can hardly be claimed that
Dow Corning's competitors can use this information to any sub-
stantial extent in preparing current PMA applications. It is
unlikely that competitors would look in any meaningful way to
studies undertaken by Dow Corning over 20 years ago in order
to satisfy 1990 testing requirements.... Given the explosion of
technology in recent years, this Court cannot accept, absent sub-
protocols also have applicability beyond the specific drug being tested and that disclosure
would have substantial commercial value to any company attempting to develop cardiovascu-
lar therapies generally.") (internal punctuation omitted).
142. Teich v. Food & Drug Admin., 751 F. Supp. 243, 255 (D.D.C. 1990).
143. Id. at 253.
144. Id. ("To argue that this type of information is confidential suggests that, in order to
protect whatever marginal commercial benefit Dow Coming may get from having independ-
ently discovered certain risks, other manufacturers be permitted to blindly put out potentially
damaging products. Certainly Dow Coming, as a good citizen, would not risk the public
health in this manner. The benefit of releasing this type of information far outstrips the negli-
gible competitive harm that defendants allege.")
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stantiation, that studies from the 1960's and 1970's are the most
productive route for Dow Corning's competitors to pursue."'
Similarly, the D.C. District Court, following Public Citizen II, con-
centrated on whether disclosure would "[be] likely to cause substantial
harm to Searle's competitive position," in ordering the release of under-
lying raw patient data to a graph about the safety effects of Celebrex.
' 46
The FDA had already released a graph summarizing the data, including
the mean and the standard error, but had withheld the underlying raw
data partially on the grounds that it "could help a current or potential
competitor to develop a research program or support a competitor's own
NDA for COX-2 Inhibitors."'47 The court pointed out that Searle, as an
intervening defendant, had not offered evidence to rebut Public Citizen's
affidavit that the raw data "would not be useful in assisting other drug
companies' product development efforts."' 48 Pointing out that Searle's
"assertions about the harm that could result from disclosing raw patient
data supporting its Celebrex NDA are strikingly similar to Schering's
assertions about the fifth IND [in Public Citizen i/],,,,49 the court ordered
the release of raw patient data. Once again, the court's decision seems to
have turned entirely on whether Searle would suffer any competitive
harm, and not whether the availability of raw data would allow a more
sound analysis of the drug's safety or efficacy.
Research data access is currently possible under the FOIA only if an
applicant can show a lack of "competitive harm." Even where there is no
competitive harm, courts have often further limited disclosure to basic
research information, positive results, and/or older studies. Limiting dis-
closure in this way is likely to minimize competitive harms, which aligns
with the approach courts have taken so far by concentrating mostly on
the private dimension of disclosure. But this type of research data ironi-
cally contains little value for advancing the public interests that I have
delineated so far. For example, limited access to older research data is
unlikely to substantially improve data quality since research data gener-
ated several decades ago are likely to be as devoid of current scientific
value as they are of the potential to cause competitive harm. Thus, be-
cause courts rarely consider the magnitude of the public interest at stake,
FOIA requests remain a poor choice by which to obtain disclosure of
relevant research data.
145. Id. at 253-54.
146. Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v. Food & Drug Admin., No. Civ.A. 99-0177,
2000 WL 34262802, at *4 (D.D.C. Jan. 19, 2000).
147. Id. at *2.
148. Id. at *3.
149. Id. at *2.
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IV. THE STATE OF THE LAW WITH RESPECT TO RESEARCH DATA
DISCLOSURE-ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. The FTSA May Constitute a Separate Barrier to Disclosure
Even when disclosure may be appropriate under the FOIA, persons
seeking disclosure have to overcome the FTSA's constraints on disclo-
sure of trade secrets.' ' ° Unlike Exemption 4, the FTSA affirmatively bars
release of information "in a manner not authorized by law.""5 ' This re-
quirement cannot be overcome by any run-of-the-mill regulation. The
Court has held that the FOIA is such a run-of-the-mill regulation."2
Under this interpretation, the scope of the FTSA is "at least co-extensive
with that of Exemption 4 of FOIA, and that, in the absence of a regula-
tion effective to authorize disclosure, the Act prohibits [disclosure that]
falls within Exemption 4." "'5 In order for a regulation to qualify as au-
thorizing law under the FTSA, the pro-disclosure party must "establish a
nexus between the regulations and some delegation of the requisite legis-
lative authority by Congress."'' 14 In requiring additional specific authority
for disclosure under the FTSA, the Court erected another barrier against
disclosure even for information disclosure authorized under the FOIA.
This barrier may not be quite as high a hurdle as it would seem, however.
In a footnote, the Chrysler Corp. court stated that the FDCA's labeling
requirements contained "explicit" legislative authority for disclosure. '"
Thus, the Court at least acknowledged some recognition for the suffi-
ciency of agency authority under the FDCA in a similar context.
Moreover, Public Citizen I, by holding that research data were not trade
secrets, arguably cabined the FTSA's flat prohibition against disclosing
trade secrets in the context of research data disclosure.'
5 6
150. McGarity, supra note 24, at 859-60.
151. See 18 U.S.C. § 1905 ("Whoever, being an officer or employee of the United States
or of any department or agency thereof.., publishes, divulges, discloses, or makes known in
any manner or to any extent not authorized by law any information coming to him in the
course of his employment or official duties ... which information concems or relates to the
trade secrets, [etc.] to be seen or examined by any person except as provided by law; shall be
fined under this title, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and shall be removed
from office or employment.") (emphasis added).
152. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 303-04 (1979) ("Govemment cannot rely
on the FOIA as congressional authorization for disclosure regulations that permit the release
of information within [the FTSA].")
153. CNA Financial Corp. v. Donovan, 830 F.2d 1132, 1151-52 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
154. Chrysler Corp., 441 U.S. at 304.
155. Id. at 306 n.38.
156. Public Citizen 1, supra note 90, at 1289 n.25.
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B. Constitutional Takings Doctrine Has Limited Applicability
in Preventing Research Data Disclosure
Even after arguments for trade secret exemptions and restrictions
under federal law fail, research data owners are likely to argue that reve-
lation of such data constitutes a "taking" of their property which justifies
compensation.'57 In fact, property arguments have been made frequently
in trade secret cases, despite the body of scholarship arguing against ac-
cording trade secrets all the attributes of property. ' 8 The Supreme Court
confirmed that "trade secrets have many of the characteristics of more
tangible forms of property"' 9 and "property right is protected by . . . the
Fifth Amendment."'" At the same time, the Court limited the scope of
protection by holding that a taking occurs when the government "inter-
feres with reasonable investment-backed expectations.' 6' With respect to
any health, safety, and environmental data, such an expectation is only
justified in the presence of an express promise of confidentiality in the
regulatory regime. 62 In doing so, the Court rejected Monsanto's argu-
ment that the FTSA constituted a promise of confidentiality. Under the
Ruckelshaus standard, "as long as [an applicant] is aware of the condi-
tions under which the data are submitted, and the conditions are
rationally related to a legitimate government interest, a voluntary sub-
mission of data ... in exchange for the economic advantages of a
registration can hardly be called a taking."'63 The Ruckselshaus decision
thus undermines the argument that research data disclosure would
constitute a taking.
V. SHIFTING THE RATIONALE: THE SCIENTIFIC
ARGUMENT FOR DISCLOSURE
A. Breakthroughs in Biotechnology and Informatics Have Transformed
Data Generation and Revolutionized Data Analysis
Phenomenal paradigmatic shifts have taken place in the life sciences
since the FDA promulgated its disclosure regulations in 1974.'6 With
157. U.S. CONST. amend. V. ("[P]rivate property [shall not] be taken for public use,
without just compensation.").
158. See Lyndon, supra note 16, at 496.
159. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984).
160. Id. at 1004.
161. Id. at 1005 (quoting Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980)).
162. See id. at 1008-10.
163. Id. at 1007.
164. A very brief, incomplete, and superficial list of some milestone achievements and
technological advances behind the paradigm shifts of the last few decades follows. In 1974,
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respect to data generation and drug development, all of the relevant life
sciences sub-disciplines have undergone significant change. A plethora
of theoretical and technological breakthroughs have enabled the genesis
and rapid adoption of disciplines such as genomics and proteomics,
which have transformed the ways in which scientists generate and ana-
lyze data. Biotechnological advances have tremendously increased the
size, sophistication, and information content of data. Laboratories across
the world are generating even greater quantities of data by conducting
large scale expression profiling experiments aimed at simultaneously
measuring thousands of molecular species critical to the workings of a
cell, such as DNA, RNA and proteins.' 6' The life sciences have shifted
focus from analyzing single genes to functionally related networks of
genes or proteins.' 66 Such high throughput experiments can be crucial to
our understanding of how drugs interact with our bodies at a molecular
level.
The scientific community is also beginning to develop new tools that
facilitate comparisons across multiple published studies in order to lev-
erage the added value of comparative data analysis.'67 An entirely new
field, bioinformatics, has emerged to meet the challenge of dealing with
the burgeoning amount of biological information by coupling "biology,
computer science, and information technology," and "enabl[ing] the
discovery of new biological insights as well as to create a global per-
spective from which unifying principles in biology can be discerned.' 68
Computational biology and data mining technologies now allow "devel-
opment of new algorithms (mathematical formulas) and statistics with
which to assess relationships among members of large data sets," and
ultimately, "a more global perspective in experimental design.'
' 69
the human genome had not yet been sequenced (nor almost any of the other model organisms'
genomes), no mammal had been cloned, site specific mutations had not yet been induced,
microarray technology did not exist, deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) and protein sequencing
methods were in their infancy, as was the application of robotics to life sciences. Most of the
commonly used research tools of today, such as ribonucleic acid (RNA) interference and the
polymerase chain reaction (PCR), had not yet been invented. For a timeline of advances in
biotechnology, see Biotechnology Industry Organization, Time Line, http://www.bio.org/
speeches/pubs/er/timeline.asp (last visited Feb. 26, 2009).
165. See, e.g., Mike Tyers & Matthias Mann, From Genomics to Proteomics, 422 NA-
TURE 198 (Mar. 13, 2003).
166. E.g., Katherine M. Nolan-Stevaux, Open Source Biology: A Means to Address the
Access & Research Gaps?, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 271, 281-82
(2007).
167. See, e.g., Gong-Hong Wei, et al., Charting Gene Regulatory Networks: Strategies,
Challenges and Perspectives, 381 BIOCHEM. J. 1,7-9 (2004).
168. Nat'l Ctr. for Biotechnology Info., Bioinformatics, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
About/primer/bioinformatics.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2010).
169. Id.
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Bioinformatics applications are not limited to data generated by
modern methodology. Meta-analyses and systematic reviews of large
datasets, ie., comparisons of large numbers of datasets for new insights
unavailable from analyzing any of them singly, may lead to new
discoveries regardless of the type of data. Any research data submitted to
the FDA may still be mined for these purposes. For example, in order to
uncover the existence of publication bias in drug trial results, the authors
of a recent article constructed a database and applied automated data
extraction and statistical analysis during a systematic review of 164
efficacy trials found in 33 NDAs and 126 publications derived from
these trials in peer-reviewed journals. " The authors were able to meta-
analyze the limited information currently available from the FDA
together with the more complete information from publications in peer-
reviewed journals. Their analysis proved that trial results with favorable
outcomes were 4.77 times more likely to be published than those with
unfavorable results.'7 ' Even with limited access to information, this study
was able to implement sophisticated analysis methods to a large amount
of data. With complete access, similar studies could lead to even more
important findings with regard to data quality and robustness.
The costs of research data secrecy have also increased in light of
technological advances.'7 ' A few examples will serve to illuminate the
increasing importance of open access to research data in this context.
Microarray technology can rapidly detect changes in expression levels of
a large number of genes, screening for changes associated with, for ex-
ample, drug treatment or disease progression.' 73 Since its inception,
microarray technology has been employed to generate enormous
amounts of data on "aging, cardiovascular diseases, cancer, and dozens
of other diseases" at "enormous cost."'' 74 Analysis of multiple microarray
datasets can potentially "identify genes that are observed in common
between different, independent studies of the same disease or treatment"
as well as "identify sets of genes that may be modulated in common
170. Kristin Rising, Peter Bacchetti & Lisa Bero, Reporting Bias in Drug Trials Submit-
ted to the Food and Drug Administration: Review of Publication and Presentation, 5 PLOS
MEDICINE 1561, 1563-64 (2008), http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/
journal.pmed.0050217.
171. Id. at 1566, tbl.2 (this finding had a p-value of 0.018).
172. Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 383.
173. See, e.g. Nat'l Center for Biotechnology Info., Microarrays: Chipping away
at the Mysteries of Science and Medicine, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/About/primer/
microarrays.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2010).
174. Patrick Cahan, et al., List of lists-annotated (LOLA): A database for annotation and
comparison of published microarray gene lists, 360 GENE 78, 79 (2005).
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between different disease states or drug treatments." '7 Genes changing in
a common fashion in multiple studies of the same disease or drug treat-
ment are more likely to be important molecules involved with that
disease or drug. A comparison of two different microarray studies of
acute myeloid leukemia contained an overlap of only nine common
genes, even though each study individually identified over 100 genes as
being associated with the disease. 76 Focusing on the small pool of com-
mon genes is theoretically more likely to yield useful information about
a particular disease, which should increase the efficiency of further stud-
ies.
Cross dataset comparisons utilizing larger sample sizes serve another
useful purpose by minimizing the impact of statistical insufficiency in-
herent in single dataset studies. Genomic analyses are often carried out
on small numbers of hard to obtain samples. Moreover, the technology is
expensive. Thus, it is often not possible to carry out such studies with a
sufficient number of replicates to absolutely minimize analytical noise.
"Because the cost of generating replicate transcript profiles is high, or
because of a limited amount of mRNA, most laboratories do not perform
replicate analyses of the same sample to determine the extent of analyti-
cal noise."'' 7  Cross dataset studies overcome the difficulties of small
sample size. Therefore, large-scale comparisons across many studies
allow genes implicated weakly by single studies in disease progression
to be more significantly correlated with that disease.
Comparisons of larger numbers of microarray datasets can highlight
functional relationships between genes. These relationships indicate genes
that co-respond to events such as the progression of a disease or the intro-
duction of a drug, in effect forming co-expression pathways or networks.
Large-scale comparisons allow aggregation of even low-confidence links
between genes in order to determine the functional relationships between
those genes. A study comparing sixty published datasets from many dif-
ferent sources allowed the elucidation of hundreds of co-expression
networks.7 8 Determining which groups of genes respond to a specific
disease or treatment focuses drug development and therefore increases
innovation efficiency.
Access to raw research data is crucial for conducting meta-analyses.
This is especially true for complex data generated by genomic or pro-
teomic studies. As the complexity of data increases, so does the
175. Id. at 79.
176. Id. at 81.
177. Stephen Welle, Gene Transcript Profiling in Aging Research, 37 EXPERIMENTAL
GERONTOLOGY 583, 586 (2002).
178. Id. at 1087-89.
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complexity of the data analysis, which makes it difficult for third parties
to evaluate the findings of a study. One recent study that evaluated gene
expression profiling studies published in peer-reviewed journals found
the conclusions reached by the original authors difficult to reproduce. 79
The problem was directly linked to data availability; the authors stated
that "many, if not most, microarray analyses could potentially be largely
reproduced if the data are available and adequately annotated and if the
analytic steps and parameters are sufficiently described."' 80 Even in the
academic community, with its culture of data accessibility, there is a
growing understanding that public access to raw data can bring about
increased benefits. Studies with "more transparent availability of data
and analyses" tend to be cited by other researchers with greater fre-
quency and have greater impact factors, indicating that scientific value
increases with data transparency.' 8 ' Responding to a perceived need,
various academic groups are leading the effort to build an infrastructure
to enable free public data sharing.'82
B. Large Scale Data and the FDA
The FDA itself has recognized the importance of genomics for drug
development.'8 In a guidance document for industry, the agency affirmed
that it has an important role to play "in the evaluation of pharmacoge-
nomic tests, both to ensure that evolving FDA policies are based on the
best science and to provide public confidence in the field." '84 Importantly,
179. John P. A. loannidis, et al., Repeatability of published microarray gene expression
analyses, 41 NATURE GENETICS 149, 151 (2009) ("When data analysis steps are very complex
and work intensive, it may be difficult or even impossible for even experienced teams of out-
siders to reproduce published studies.").
180. Id.
181. Id. at 151-52.
182. See Proteomecommons.org, What is the Proteome Commons Tranche repository?,
https://proteomecommons.org/tranche/about.jsp (last visited Mar. 1, 2009) (providing an ex-
ample of a peer-to-peer data sharing tool for proteomics). See also Nat'l Institutes of Health,
NIH Data Sharing Policy and Implementation Guidance, http://grants.nih.gov/grants/policy/
data.sharing/datasharing-guidance.htm (last visited May 10, 2010) ("Data should be made
as widely and freely available as possible while safeguarding the privacy of participants, and
protecting confidential and proprietary data.").
183. See FDA, CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, MANUAL OF POLICIES AND
PROCEDURES: PROCESSING AND REVIEWING VOLUNTARY GENOMIC DATA SUBMISSIONS (2005)
http:lwww.fda.govldownIoads/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/StaffPoiciesandProcedures
/ucm073575.pdf (setting forth procedures for genomic data submission to the agency); FDA,
Draft Guideline, E15 Terminology in Pharmacogenomics, http:llwww.fda.gov/OHRMS/
DOCKETS/98fr106d-0526-gd10001.pdf (last visited Aug. 6, 2009) (establishing a common
terminology for use in evaluating pharmacogenomic data); FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY,
PHARMACOGENOMIC DATA SUBMISSIONS (2005), http:llwww.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/
GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylnformation/Guidances/ucm079849.pdf.
184. Id. at 3.
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the FDA stated its goal was to "encourage open and public sharing of
data and information on pharmacogenomic test results,"' 85 though the
field was not yet "well enough established" for the regulatory decision
making process.'86 The FDA agrees that it is likely that manufacturers
will increasingly turn to the analytical and predictive powers of -omics
technologies to generate data. 87 Currently, however, pharmacogenomic
data submissions remain voluntary and are not part of the FDA's regula-
tory decision making process. '88 The guidance document does not state a
clear position on public disclosure other than affirming a desire to en-
courage sharing. 9
C. Scientific Advances Have Radically Transformed the
Public Interest in Research Data Disclosure
The public interest in disclosure has grown concomitantly with the
rapid advances in life sciences. Bioinformatics methodology allows sci-
entists to perform data mining at a level of sophistication previously
impossible to achieve. Data mining has the potential to elucidate results
from both legacy data as well as more modern, large-scale pharmacoge-
nomic or proteomic studies. Public availability of existing as well as
ongoing pre-clinical experiments and clinical trial results would allow
the power of bioinformatic analysis to be brought on drug safety and
efficacy determinations. Enabling such analyses across many datasets
has utility beyond strengthening statistical relevance. Drug manufactur-
ers may themselves benefit by meta-analyzing pooled research data
regarding all other molecules in the same class and by being able to
more quickly eliminate potentially troublesome compounds earlier in the
drug development process. This should allow them to focus their efforts
on more relevant targets, and/or engaging in more targeted drug design.
In fact, realizing the potential of large scale informatics, several compa-
nies have begun to offer, in addition to analysis software, access to
compiled datasets derived from published studies.' 90 The appearance of
such service-oriented start-ups confirms the notion that there is both a
185. Id.
186. Id. at 2.
187. Id. at 5 ("As the field of pharmacogenomics advances, it is likely (and desirable)
that sponsors will begin to use pharmacogenomic tests to support drug development and/or to
guide therapy.").
188. Id. at 14.
189. Supra note 184 and accompanying text.
190. See, e.g., Compendia Biosciences, MAPK Pathway Signatures in Oncomine (2008),
http://www.compendiabio.com/pdfs/MAPK-Webinar.pdf.
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market advantage and scientific value in applying informatics methodol-
ogy to large-scale data.
In addition to the usual rationales supporting data disclosure,' 9' data
has changed fundamentally since the FDA formulated its disclosure pol-
icy and chose secrecy over transparency. Even then, the agency
acknowledged the precarious balance between private secrecy and public
disclosure.'92 Today's data generation and bioinformatics methodologies
have transformed the scientific potential of research data and boosted the
need to advance the public interest over the private. The balance has
firmly swung in favor of disclosure.
CONCLUSION
The FDA requires that manufacturers study the safety and efficacy
of their products. The FDA's goal, in accordance with its mission to pro-
tect the public health, is to insure that these studies yield high quality,
scientifically rigorous research data.' 93 Scientifically sound data is the
fulcrum of the approval process. Due to data generation costs, the threat
of free-riding by competitors who may use the data to gain approval for
their own compounds, and the potential that research data access may
reveal information either beneficial to competitors or harmful to the
owner, it has value beyond its scientific merits. The FDA has long rec-
ognized the manufacturers' interests in secrecy by treating research data
as trade secrets and/or confidential business information.
Nevertheless, trade secret doctrine is an ill-fitting restraint within the
drug regulatory context. The doctrine developed around the need to pro-
tect commercial interests and enable businesses to fully capture the
economic benefits of innovation by "keep[ing] secret, for a potentially
unlimited time, those formulas, processes and inventions that afford
them pecuniary gain."'' 94 Yet the FDA regulatory framework exists to pro-
tect the public health, which necessitates that the nature and magnitude
of the public interest in disclosure be taken into account. The agency's
cognizance of this conflict has led it to request Congress to intervene in
the past. '
Overvalued research data has the potential to distort the scientific
process by increasing the incentive to achieve positive outcomes.
191. E.g., Shapiro, supra note 13, at 158-61 (ethical considerations); Wagner &
Michaels, supra note 37, at 122-28 (ends-oriented biases in study design and reporting).
192. See supra notes 67-69.
193. Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 373.
194. Levine, supra note 16, at 136.
195. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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Empirical studies and insider reports verify that secrecy is indeed lead-
ing to distortions and loss of data quality. Moreover, advances in data
generation methods have resulted in more complex research data con-
tent. These incipient attributes have also transformed data analysis.
Analyses are more difficult to conduct, complicating third party review
of results. One of the most effective ways to overcome these shortcom-
ings is to open research data held by the FDA to public access.
At the same time, progress in informatics technology has reshaped
the nature and magnitude of the public interest. Meta-analysis using
modern bioinformatics methodologies can increase data quality and
yield heretofore inaccessible discoveries. Large scale reviews of publicly
available datasets have already produced valuable insights into drug
mechanisms of action and advanced our understanding of gene net-
works. Publicly available research data would constitute a windfall for
similar comparative studies. This would not only benefit our general un-
derstanding of drugs and their effects, but also help pharmaceutical
companies refine and focus their development process, thus leading to
cost savings. Continuing to sequester research data as trade secrets or
confidential information stunts our ability to achieve these innovation
efficiencies.
Because of the conflict between the FDA's mission and its inability
to incorporate public interests into its research data confidentiality pol-
icy, existing legal mechanisms have failed to enable public access to
research data. The agency's insistence on processing disclosure requests
via the FOIA mechanism has exacerbated the problem. As a general pur-
pose transparency statute, the FOIA is susceptible to a narrow
interpretation where a court can deny data access based on a notion that
any involvement of private interests renders disclosure impossible, for
example, if it is not directly related to "what the government is up to.
''6
Courts' refusal to account for the public interest in research data disclo-
sure make the FOIA an imperfect vehicle to balance valid competing
interests. 197
While the public need for disclosure has grown, part of the rationale
for secrecy has disappeared. Free-riding in obtaining regulatory approval
196. See supra notes 135-136 and accompanying text.
197. Each year, the FDA receives more FOIA requests than any other government
agency except the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The backlog of FOIA requests at the FDA
exceeded that for the Department of Defense and the Justice Department for FY 2006. Justin
Blum, Drug, Food Risks Stay Secret as Inquiries to U.S. FDA Pile Up, BLOOMBERG.COM,
June 19, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=a9lFU255oQBM
&refer=news.
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became a non-issue in the U.S. after the Hatch-Waxman Act.' 98 The re-
maining private interest in data as a tool to gain foreign regulatory
approval is not strong enough to offset the increasing innovation effi-
ciencies disclosure would bring. An overhaul of existing laws is needed
in order to enable public access to research data held by the FDA and
take advantage of the benefits of such access. Potential solutions include
voluntary disclosure by manufacturers, new congressional and/or state
legislation with an explicit disclosure mandate, or the FDA acting
through its rulemaking powers to mandate disclosure. Both the pharma-
ceutical industry and the government have created trial registry
websites,' 99 and Congress has introduced legislation in both houses. 00
Similar bills were also introduced in nine states, with each piece of legis-
lation mandating different levels of disclosure.
The FDA can and should reconsider the tectonic shifts in the inter-
ests at stake and revise its research data confidentiality policy. If the
FDA cannot, or chooses not to do so, a simple and direct Congressional
mandate for full disclosure is the next best remedy, since a state-by-state
approach has many shortcomings and may be difficult to implement. Al-
though manufacturers may suffer commercial harm as a result of
disclosure, their level of harm is likely to be offset by the potentially
enormous scientific gains that are likely to be made possible by a regime
of full disclosure. While mandating disclosure, Congress could amelio-
rate some of the harm to manufacturers by considering a limited period
of research data exclusivity. Research data exclusivity would prevent
competitors and generic manufacturers from using data access as a
means to gain regulatory approval while allowing research data to be
mined for maximum benefit.
198. See supra Part II.B.
199. Clinicaltrials.gov contains the NIH's list of clinical trials. Clinicalstudyresults.org is
a summary results database organized by Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America. Neither database contains actual results.
200. See Aneel Damle, Peter Lurie & Sidney M. Wolfe, A Policy Study of Clinical Trial
Registries and Results Databases, PUBLIC CITIZEN, July 17, 2007, http://www.citizen.org/
publications/release.cfm?iD=7534&seclD= I 656&catlD= I 26#_ednref I (containing an excel-
lent review of all existing legislation, as well as existing databases).
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